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Uniform Commercial Code-Disclaimer Clause of
Implied Warranties Extended to Leases Analogous to Sale
Pioneer Leasing Corporation1 brought suit to recover the balance due
from a lessee under a sixty-month, non-cancellable lease of an ice-making
machine. The lease contained a general provision disclaiming any warranties
or representations regarding the leased item.' Sawyer, the lessee, discon-
tinued payments under the lease, asserting that the lease was procured by
misrepresentation' and that the machine was not fit for its intended pur-
pose. The trial court rejected this assertion and directed a verdict in favor
of the lessor for the unpaid balance. Held, reversed: The provisions of the
Arkansas Uniform Commercial Code governing disclaimer of implied
warranty of merchantability and implied warranty of fitness are applicable
to leases where the provisions of the lease are analogous to a sale. Sawyer
v. Pioneer Leasing Corp., 244 Ark. 943, 428 S.W.2d 46 (1968).
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SALES CONCEPT-LEASE OR SALE
The basic concept of what constitutes a sale has been codified and re-
fined since 1893, originally adopting as its basis the common law defini-
tion of a sale.4 But the problem of whether or not a lease agreement is
included within the definition of a sale has remained unsettled. As a gen-
eral rule courts did not interpret the Uniform Sales Act to include a lease
within its definition of sale because the term sale implied passage of
absolute title.' Similar to the general rule under the Uniform Sales Act,
most writers' apparently would agree that article 2 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code was intended to cover only traditional sales transactions.
Indeed, one source has stated specifically that a lease is not within the scope
of transactions intended to be covered by article 2,' reasoning that article 2
'Pioneer is a Delaware corporation engaged in the equipment leasing business. A sales agent of
the supplier of the ice machine represented the machine to Sawyer and secured the signed lease.
Thereafter, Pioneer purchased the machine from the supplier.
2 Clause five of the lease provided that "No warranties or representations regarding the items
herein leased or their condition, quality, or suitability, or their freedom from latent defects, have
been made or shall be deemed to be made by the Lessor, and Lessee has selected the items
leased and the same have been delivered to Lessee at Lessee's sole risk and discretion."
a The sales agent representing the supplier told Sawyer that the capacity of the machine was
400 pounds per day, and that it would function equally well inside or outside. In addition, litera-
ture produced by the agent substantiated this capacity and mentioned "winterized" features of the
machine. Sawyer placed the machine outside and it functioned properly for about six months;
then at the first cold spell it malfunctioned. Sawyer spent $200 during the winter and spring
attempting to correct the malfunction, but was unsuccessful. Shortly thereafter Sawyer stopped
all lease payments.
" At common law a sale was defined as a transfer of property from one person to another for
a consideration of value. Howard v. Harris, 8 Allen (Mass.) 297, 299 (1864). The Sales Act
codified this reasoning and defined a sale as "an agreement whereby the seller transfers the property
in goods to the buyer for a consideration called the price .... " UNIFORM SALES ACT § 1 (2);
L. VOLD, THE LAW OF SALES 9 (1959). The Uniform Commercial Code superseded the Sales Act
and defined the sale as "the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price." UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-106(1).
'Arnold v. North Am. Chem. Co., 232 Mass. 196, 122 N.E. 283 (1919).
a J. RAPHAEL, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SIMPLIFIED 3 (1967); Minish, The UCC in Min-
nesota: Articles 2 and 6-Sales and Bulk Transfers, 50 MINN. L. REV. 103 (1965); Spies, Article II,
16 ARK. L. REV. 6-7 (1961).
7For example, if the lessee was by terms of the agreement to become owner or have the option
of becoming owner, the courts tended to look through the form to the substance and treat the
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applies only to business transactions where actual title is transferred. How-
ever, believing that a lease passes ownership of a limited right short of
complete title, some courts have created exceptions treating a lease as a
form of sale."
II. EXPRESS AND IMPLIED WARRANTIES
An express warranty at common law arose from a simple representation
or affirmation regarding the sales property. The expression could be oral
or written, and was not restricted by the limitations placed upon implied
warranties.! An implied warranty, however, was a creation of the common
law, designed to impose an obligation upon the seller under certain cir-
cumstances, without regard to the parties' intentions or the terms of any
agreement."0
Implied warranties at common law were divided into two main cate-
gories-implied warranty of fitness and implied warranty of merchant-
ability. An implied warranty of fitness arose only where it could be im-
plied from the circumstances of the sale; otherwise, the common law
maxim of caveat emptor applied." However, where the buyer indicated
that he was purchasing the goods for a particular purpose and relied upon
the seller's skill and judgment to assist him in his selection, an implied
warranty arose that the goods would be fit for that particular purpose."
The Code continues the common law concepts, imposing an implied war-
ranty that the goods are fit for the particular purpose for which the buyer
sought the goods, provided the seller has reason to know of this purpose,
and provided the buyer relies on the skill or judgment of the seller. I"
The implied warranty of merchantability has been limited traditionally
to sellers who dealt in goods of a particular description." Under the Code,
lease as a conditional sale. See First Nat'l Bank v. Phillips, 261 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1958); In re
Press Printers & Publishers, 4 F.2d 159 (D.N.J. 1924); Imbesi v. Eastern Motor Co., 102 N.J.L.
193, 130 A. 611 (Ct. Err. & App. 1925); Siffran v. Grillo, 4 N.J. Misc. 618, 133 A. 772 (Sup.
Ct. 1926). If the option was exercisable at a nominal price, some courts viewed the arrangement
as a conditional sale. See Kennedy-Van Saun Mfg. Co. & Eng'r Corp. v. Kinsella, 72 F.2d 338 (3d
Cir. 1934); Burroughs Adding Mach. Co. v. Bogdon, 9 F.2d 54 (8th Cir. 1925); L. VOLD, THE
LAW OF SALES 328-9 (1959). However, if the option could only be exercised by paying a sub-
stantial additional amount, the courts usually considered the agreement a lease. See In re Nat'l Eng'r
& Equip. Co., 256 F. 985 (W.D. Wash. 1918); Wellman v. Conroy, 50 Cal. App. 141, 194 P.
728 (1921). Even if both parties intended not to form a sale and stipulated a lease arrangement,
the courts nevertheless have treated the lease as a conditional sale if inexpensive lease options were
present. See Am. Can Co. v. White, 130 Ark. 381, 197 S.W. 695 (1917). 1 F. MECHEN, LAW OF
SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 569 (1901), lists a long string of cases where such leases were held
to be conditional sales contracts. Where the lessor reserved the right to resume possession upon de-
fault of the lease, the courts continued to treat the lease as a conditional sale. See Hervey v. R.I.
Locomotive Works, 93 U.S. 664 (1876); Hays v. Jordan, 85 Ga. 741, 11 S.E. 833 (1890); Smith
v. Aldrich, 180 Mass. 367, 62 N.E. 381 (1902); Campbell v. Atherton, 92 Me. 66, 42 A. 232
(1898).
s C. BUNN, H. SNEAD, & R. SPEIDEL, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE 30 (1964).
977 C.J.S. Sales § 308 (1952).
"046 AM. JuR. Sales § 332 (1943).
" Barnard v. Kellogg, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 383 (1870); Miller v. Tiffany, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.)
298 (1863); F. TIFFANY, LAW OF SALES § 78 (1908).
" Kellogg Bridge Co. v. Hamilton, 110 U.S. 108 (1883); Breen v. Moran, 51 Minn. 525, 53
N.W. 755 (1892); F. TIFFANY, LAW OF SALES § 78 (1908).
l UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-315.
14UNIFORM SALES ACT § 15(2); W. MALCOLM, THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE HANDBOOK 36-7 (1964).
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however, the requisite of sale by description is eliminated and if the seller
is a merchant who deals with the goods sold, a warranty of merchantability
is implied unless expressly excluded or modified by disclaimer."
Authorities have long advocated the idea of extending the protection of
implied warranties, both of fitness and merchantability, to leases as well
as to sales transactions." However, the courts have been willing thus far
to extend the protection of implied warranties of fitness, but not implied
warranties of merchantability.'
Prior to the Code a disclaimer of any warranty in the agreement, either
express or implied, was valid if it appeared anywhere in the contract, and
if its existence and nature were understood as a term of the bargain."
The effect of such a disclaimer was to make inoperative and invalid any
affirmations or representations on a sale." Under the Code, disclaimers of
an implied warranty of merchantability and an implied warranty of fit-
ness must be conspicuous,2' so that reasonable persons "ought to have
noticed it.""'
III. SAWYER V. PIONEER LEASING CORP.
In Sawyer the court was faced with the problem of deciding whether
the lessor of an ice-making machine could recover the balance due from a
lessee who refused to make further payments when the machine proved
to be unfit for its intended purpose. The Sawyer court concluded that no
express warranties had been made by the salesman" who negotiated the
lease. However, the court rejected the contention that proper functioning
of the machine for six months (approximately one-tenth of the total lease
period) would satisfy any implied warranty, reasoning that an implied
warranty would extend beyond this fractional period. The court also felt
that the disclaimer clause in the lease agreement did not comply with the
"UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314.
102 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, TORTS § 28.19 (1956); L. VOLD, THE LAW or5 SALES § 94 (1959);
Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 653, 673-4
(1957); Annot. 68 A.L.R.2d 850 (1959).
"7 Interstate Grocery Co. v. Southern Shell & Fish Co., 228 Ark. 118, 305 S.W.2d 850 (1957);
Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing, 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965); Demos Constr. Co. v.
Service Supply Corp., 153 Pa. Super. 623, 34 A.2d 828 (1943); Hartford Battery Sales Corp.
v. Prine, 119 Pa. Super. 165, 181 A. 95 (1935); Simpson v. Powder Prod., Inc., 24 Conn. Super.
409, 192 A.2d 555 (1963); Henry v. Hostetler, 3 U.C.C. REP. 614 (1966).
"Asphaltic Enterprises, Inc. v. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp., 39 F.R.D. 574 (1966); Buckley
v. Shell Chem. Co., 32 Cal. App. 2d 209, 89 P.2d 453 (1939); Belt Seed Co. v. Mitchelhill Seed
Co., 236 Mo. App. 142, 153 S.W.2d 106, 108-9 (1941); Railroad Winterproofing Corp. v. Memphis
Supply, Inc., 303 N.Y. 849, 104 N.E.2d 486 (1952).
"'77 C.J.S. Sales § 312(c) (1952).
'0 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316(2). For fitness the disclaimer may be in general lan-
guage as long as it is in writing and is conspicuous; for merchantability the disclaimer must men-
tion merchantability and be conspicuous if in writing.
21 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201(10).
22 Barnett, the person with whom Sawyer initially dealt in purchasing the machine, was a sales
agent for the supplier of the equipment, Tri-State Ice Machine Company. The court, in resolving
Pioneer's contention that Barnett was not an agent of Pioneer, reiterated its holding in Mark v.
Maberry, 222 Ark. 357, 260 S.W.2d 455 (1953), where it had held that one who accepts the fruit
of another's agency in the sale of property cannot subsequently be heard to disclaim such agency.
Applied to the facts of this case, the agency was established because Pioneer had accepted the fruits
of the lease.
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disclaimer clause requirements of the Code because it was not conspicuous."
Although the Arkansas supreme court recognized that the lease agree-
ment was not a sale,2" it relied upon four authorities to justify extension
of the disclaimer clause of the Code to this lease. The first authority'
substantiated the practice of extending implied warranties to non-sale
cases including leases, contending that transactions similar to sales should
and could enjoy the protection of implied warranties by a process of
analogy. The second authority" advocated a similar process of analogy
reasoning that article 2 could be applicable to those leases which have
terms similar to a sale. Based upon these two authorities, the court drew its
conclusion that "there is respectable authority for applying code provi-
sions in some instances where the transaction is analogous to a sale.""
Recognizing that the two authorities discussed above did not discuss the
exact point in issue, the disclaimer clause, the court cited two cases to
point out that application of the disclaimer provisions to a lease agreement
had received judicial recognition. First, the court relied upon a New York
case' in which the lessee had contended that a lease was unconscionable
and within section 2-302 of the Code. The Arkansas court reasoned that
the issue of Code disclaimer provisions in the New York case had been
urged as applicable to leases, and would have merited a point of reversal.
Secondly, a tort case' involving breach of warranty of fitness, but decided
under common law, was noted as authority for application of implied
warranties to leases. There the court held that a contract for leasing a truck
gave rise to an implied warranty that it was fit for contemplated use by the
injured plaintiff's employer. The Arkansas court felt the same rationale
for applying the warranty to leases in tort cases also justified application
in contract cases.
The Arkansas supreme court was confronted with a lessee seemingly un-
justly harmed, but without any apparent remedy because the lease dis-
claimer clause would have satisfied the common law elements of effective
waiver.' Thus the lessee would have had no remedy unless the court could
bring the arrangement within the protective umbrella of the Code, or
interpret the arrangement to be a sale. The court did not interpret the
lease as a sale because of the redelivery provision, but pursued the idea of
bringing the lease within the Code by the process of analogy. The court
applied only the disclaimer provision of the Code to leases because it was
the only issue necessarily before the court, and apparently because the
2" UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316(2) requires that the disclaimer clause be conspicuous,
and the clause in this lease was noted by the court to be in very small print.
24 Clause eight called for immediate redelivery of the leased goods to the lessor at termination
of the lease term, thus under the terms of the agreement no sale was involved.
25 Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 653
(1950).
2 F. HART & W. WILLIER, FORMS AND PROCEDURES UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE 5 12.02(1) (1966).
27 Sawyer v. Pioneer Leasing Corp., 244 Ark. 943, 428 S.W.2d 46, 52 (1968).
" Fairfield Lease Corp. v. Colonial Aluminum Sales, Inc., 3 U.C.C. REP. 858 (1966).
2 Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing, 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965).
3077 C.J.S. Sales 312(c) (1952).
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application of Code provisions to leases was an unusual and somewhat un-
precedented practice.
The court seemed to be using the Code as a vehicle to reach a desired
result by applying only one section of the Code to the lease. If Sawyer were
made subject to the duties of the Code, in addition to enjoying its protec-
tion, it is possible that his conduct would have constituted an effective
waiver of any breach of warranty, either under common law or under the
Code, because he may not have rejected the goods within a reasonable time
after discovery of the breach.'
Justice Fogleman, in his dissent, raised the question of whether the
authority cited by the majority warranted the extension of the Code dis-
claimer provision to leases. He pointed out that only the accepted practice
of extending the common law implied warranty doctrine to leases had been
fully established by the majority opinion."s He further asserted that if this
doctrine had been applied in this case a different result would have been
reached since the printed disclaimer clause in the lease would have con-
stituted an effective disclaimer of all warranties and representations." In
accusing the court of acting "legislatively," 4 he was critical of the failure
of the majority opinion to establish workable guidelines for determining
when a lease is sufficiently analogous to a sale to justify extension of the
disclaimer provision of the Code.
IV. CONCLUSION
In its extension of the disclaimer clause provisions to leases which are
analogous to sales, the Arkansas supreme court has made a noteworthy
application of the Uniform Commercial Code. Partial justification for this
action may be found in the accepted practice of extending the common
law implied warranty doctrine to leases, and the past line of cases, not
involving the Code, where the courts have imposed strict liability either
in warranty or tort on various non-sale transactions.' Further support
might be found in one recent extension of the Code where the implied
warranty provisions were made applicable to a beauty operator applying
a permanent wave treatment." But aside from this partial justification this
court has ignored a long line of cases requiring a basic contract of sale in
" Such contentions were expressed by Pioneer upon petition for rehearing before the Arkansas
supreme court, relying upon UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-606, and Green Chevrolet Co. v.
Kemp, 241 Ark. 62, 406 S.W.2d 142 (1966). It is interesting to note that this same Arkansas
court did apply the waiver conditioned upon failure to give timely notice to a case similar to
Sawyer. See Ingle v. Marked Tree Equip. Co., 244 Ark. 1166, 428 S.W.2d 286 (1968), also ap-
pearing in 5 U.C.C. REp. 466 (1968). There the buyer attempted to raise the defense of breach
of warranty but was precluded because of a two-month delay in giving notice of the breach. In
Sawyer six months lapsed after initial discovery of the malfunction until notice was given of
intent not to be bound by the terms of the lease.
" The support for this doctrine appears in cases and authorities cited notes 17, 18, and 2S
supra.
as 7 7 C.J.S. Sales § 312(c) (1952).
" Sawyer v. Pioneer Leasing Corp., 244 Ark. 943, 428 S.W.2d 46, 55 (1968).
a 11 AM. TRIAL LAWYERS Ass'N NEws LETTER 424-5 (1968). In discussing the Newmark
case, note 36 infra, it cites a long line of cases holding that strict liability of warranty is properly
applicable to certain non-sale transactions.
" Newmark v. Gimbel's Inc., 102 N.J. Super. 279, 246 A.2d 11 (Super. Ct. 1968).
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order to apply the warranty Code provisions upon which section 2-316 (2)
rests.
3 7
Whether other state courts follow the Arkansas precedent will de-
pend upon their willingness to extend the application of the Code to such
cases. In Texas the separation of sale and lease has been well defined by
the courts." However, a recent Texas cases has held that the nature of an
agreement, whether a lease or a conditional sale, is to be determined by
the intention of the parties. It seems plausible that this test could be applied
to Sawyer-like facts to determine that the transaction was a conditional
sale under the Code. Thus Texas could possibly accord protection to leases
analogous to sales by changing their title to conditional sales through the
intention test without having to distort the Code.
The Sawyer court appears to have reached an equitable result in extend-
ing the disclaimer provision of the Code to this lease. With the frequency
and acceptability of lease arrangements in today's commercial and eco-
nomic society, justice might very well be best served by bringing leases
analogous to sales within the Code. But such expansion of the Code could
best be accomplished by legislative enactments in the various states de-
signed to make all provisions of article 2 applicable to the lease analogous
to a sale, and thus help preserve the nation-wide uniformity of commercial
law under the Code.
Terry E. Sheldon
3 As pertains to the implied warranty of merchantability, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §
2-314, see Cheshire v. Southhampton Hosp. Ass'n, 53 Misc. 2d 355, 278 N.Y.S.2d 531 (Sup. Ct.
1967); Aegis Prod., Inc. v. Arriflex Corp. of America, 25 App. Div. 2d 639, 268 N.Y.S.2d 185
(1966); Victor v. Barzaleski, 19 Pa. D. & C.2d 698 (1960). As pertains to the implied warranty
of fitness, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-315, see Amacorp Indus. Leasing Co. v. Robert C.
Young Ass'n, 237 Cal. App. 2d 724, 47 Cal. Rptr. 294 (1965); Sylvia Coal Co. v. Mercury Coal
& Coke Co., 151 W. Va. 818, 156 S.E.2d 1 (1967).
" Although Texas did not adopt the Uniform Sales Act, it has long been recognized in Texas
that an agreement for lease of personal property which requires the lessee to return and redeliver
the property at the expiration of the lease term is a form of bailment, and not a sale. See
Hamilton v. Willing, 73 Tex. 603, 11 S.W. 843 (1889); Lang v. Rickmers, 70 Tex. 108,
7 S.W. 527 (1888); Mitchell v. Eagle Creek Oil Co., 275 S.W. 211 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925);
McElwrath & Rogers v. Alexander, 250 S.W. 1051 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923), error dismissed; Farmers
Nat'l Bank v. Henderson, 29 S.W. 562 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895). It has been equally well established
in Texas that in order to constitute a sale there must be a vesting of title in the buyer. See J.C.
Engleman, Inc. v. Sanders Nursery Co., 140 S.W.2d 500 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940), error ref. The
Uniform Commercial Code became law in Texas on 1 July 1966, and now comprises TEx. Bus.
& COMM. CODE §§ 1.101-9.507 (1967).
"' Security Life Ins. Co. v. Executive Car Leasing Co., 433 S.W.2d 915 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
This case cites as support for its intention test Purity Creamery Co. v. Hays, 4 S.W.2d 1056 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1928), where the holding was reversed because the lower court had construed the con-
tract as a sale in the face of the parties' intention not to form a sale, but a rental contract.
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